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One of the virtues of peer review is that it provides a self-regulating selection mechanism for
scientific work, papers and projects. Peer review as a selection mechanism is hard to evaluate in
terms of its efficiency. Serious efforts to understand its strengths and weaknesses have not yet lead
to clear answers. In theory peer review works if the involved parties (editors and referees) conform
to a set of requirements, such as love for high quality science, objectiveness, and absence of biases,
nepotism, friend and clique networks, selfishness, etc. If these requirements are violated, what is
the effect on the selection of high quality work? We study this question with a simple agent based
model. In particular we are interested in the effects of rational referees, who might not have any
incentive to see high quality work other than their own published or promoted. We find that a small
fraction of incorrect (selfish or rational) referees can drastically reduce the quality of the published
(accepted) scientific standard. We quantify the fraction for which peer review will no longer select
better than pure chance. Decline of quality of accepted scientific work is shown as a function of the
fraction of rational and unqualified referees. We show how a simple quality-increasing policy of e.g.
a journal can lead to a loss in overall scientific quality, and how mutual support-networks of authors
and referees deteriorate the system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
”Dear Sir, We had sent you our manuscript for publica-
tion and had not authorized you to show it to specialists
before it is printed...” was A. Einstein’s reply to the edi-
tor of Physical Review when he received the rejection of
a 1936 paper with N. Rosen [1]. To Einstein peer review
was not a familiar system at the time. Quality selection
of scientific work was dominated by autonomous deci-
sions of editors of unquestionable authority (e.g. Max
Plank for Annalen der Physik) or – for the more senior
scientists – by academy memberships. Since these days
scientific publishing has changed to a practically all dom-
inating peer review system, worldwide and across disci-
plines. Today most journals employ single-blind peer re-
view. This transition to peer review set in after WWII,
partly as a response to the increase of scientific research
at that time.
Peer review is a system that subjects scientific work
to scrutiny of experts in the field. If the standards of
scientific rigor, technical correctness, novelty and the cri-
terion of sufficient interest are approved by usually 2-3
peers, the work gets published. In this way the authority
of science – represented by a team of experts of a par-
ticular community – self-regulates its quality standards.
Ideally, these standards should be kept as high as pos-
sible. The peer review system is largely perceived as to
meet this aim, as one of the best possible ways, with –
at present – little alternatives [2, 3].
Peer review suffers from well known problems [4],
maybe the most impressive one being that its efficiency
∗Electronic address: stefan.thurner@meduniewien.ac.at
is largely unknown and practically untested [5]. The
Cochrane collaboration has not found evidence that peer
review works, nor that it does not [6]. In an experiment
peer review has been tested for its ability to detect er-
rors in scientific papers. A paper with 8 deliberate errors
was sent to 420 reviewers. The average number of de-
tected errors was 2, nobody spotted 5 or more errors,
and 16% did not spot a single error [7]. Further, peer
review leaves room for bias on both the reviewer’s and
editor’s side. Evidence for existence of nationality, lan-
guage, speciality, reputation and gender biases have been
reported [8, 9].
A fundamental problem of the peer review process is
that it introduces conflicting interests or moral hazard
problems in a variety of situations. By accepting high
quality work and thus promoting it, the referee risks to
draw the attention to these ideas and possibly away from
her own. A post-doc looking for his next position is
maybe not happy to accept a good paper of his peer who
competes for the same position. A big-shot in a particu-
lar field might fear to risk his ’guru status’ by accepting
challenging and maybe better ideas than his own, etc. In
other words, referees who optimize their overall ’utility’
(status, papers, fame, position, ...) might find that ac-
cepting good scientific work of others is in direct conflict
with their own utility maximization. In the following we
call utility optimizing referees rational. They avoid to
accept better work than their own.
It is clear that in the presence of referees with con-
flicting interests the quality selection aspect of the peer
review system will work sub-optimally. Here we present
a simple agent based model to assess the robustness of
the quality selection component of peer review under the
presence of rational referees. The choice of an agent
based model is motivated by the absence of alternatives
2to assess efficiency. It is possible to demonstrate that
the concept of peer review works fine as long as rational
referees are absent. However, the system is extremely
sensitive to perturbations. The model allows to illus-
trate the impact of rational behavior, of friendship net-
works (nepotism), and counter-intuitive effects, e.g. from
quality-increasing management policies, implemented by
journals or funding agencies.
Here we solely focus on the quality selection aspect of
peer review and ignore its other potential benefits such
as improvement of papers through spell checking, error
detection, completing references, cost efficiency, etc. Also
we will not discuss its inadequacy to select novel ideas
[10, 11], nor its experimentally confirmed conformatory
bias [12, 13]. From the quality selection perspective only,
we find that unless the fractions of rational and unreliable
referees are kept well below 30%, peer review will not
perform better than pure chance, e.g. by throwing a coin.
It is interesting to see this finding in the light of recently
proposed semi-random selection process which has been
shown to have a economic value-adding component in the
context of R&D projects [10].
II. MODEL
We consider a scientific community of N productive
scientists. Each scientist produces one paper every 2
time-units t (e.g. one paper every 2 weeks, years or
decades). We make two assumptions about the authors:
(1) The scientific quality of authors follows a Gaus-
sian distribution, i.e. each author i is assigned an
’IQ’ index, Qauthori , drawn from a normal distribution
Qauthori ∈ N(100, σ
2
author). We consider mature scien-
tists, i.e. Qauthori is constant over time (no learning or
intellectual decline). We set σauthor = 10.
(2) Author i produces papers which vary in quality,
fluctuating around his average quality Qauthori . We
assume these fluctuations to be Gaussian with vari-
ance σ2quality. The quality of a paper submitted by
i at timestep t is Qsubmiti (t) ∈ N(Q
author
i , σ
2
quality).
For simplicity σquality = 5 is the same for all au-
thors. The distribution of all submitted papers thus
is N(100, σ2author + σ
2
quality). The essence of the review
process is now to select the good papers from these
submissions.
At every timestep each submitted paper is sent to 2
independent referees, randomly chosen from the N sci-
entists. The possibility of self-review is excluded. Each
reviewer produces a binary recommendation within the
same timestep: ’accept’ or ’reject’. If a paper gets 2 ’ac-
cept’ it is accepted, if it gets 2 ’reject’, it is rejected, if
there is a tie (1 ’accept’ and 1 ’reject’) it gets accepted
with a probability of 0.5. Upon acceptance a submitted
paper becomes an accepted paper, the quality of which
is now denoted by Qaccepti (t). We assume each scientist,
when acting as a referee, to belong to one of four referee
types:
• The correct: Accepts good and rejects bad pa-
pers. A paper from author j is considered good
by referee i, if its quality is above a minimum re-
quirement Qmin. This minimum requirement can
be modeled in various ways. Here we say that
the minimum paper quality – set e.g. by a jour-
nal – is that it lies within the top q-quantile of
recently published papers in the field. To com-
pute this quantile we first use a simple exponential
moving average to compute the average: M(t) =
λM(t−1)+(1−λ)〈Qaccepti (t−1)〉i, with λ = 0.1. 〈.〉i
indicates the average over all accepted papers. The
top q-quantile is now everything above this mov-
ing average plus α times one standard deviation
of the distribution of recently published papers,
Qmin(t) = M(t) + α std[Qaccepti (t − 1)]. In other
words, referee i accepts a paper if Qsubmiti (t) ≥
Qmin(t).
• The stupid (random): This referee can not judge
the quality of a paper (e.g. because of incompe-
tence or lack of time) and takes a random decision
on a paper.
• The rational: The rational referee knows that
work better than his/her own might draw atten-
tion away from his/her own work. For him there is
no incentive to accept anything better than one’s
own work, while it might be fine to accept worse
quality. Referee i rejects papers from authors j
whenever they are above his/her quality index,
Qauthori < Q
submit
j (t). i accepts papers when they
are between a minimum quality threshold and his
own index, i.e. Qsubmitj (t) ∈ [Q
submit
min , Q
author
i ]. For
simplicity we set Qsubmitmin = 90 constant.
• The altruist: Accepts all papers. The referee
might simply not care or could fear that his identity
might get disclosed through e.g. editorial mistakes.
• The misanthropist: Rejects all papers.
Recommendations of the altruist and misanthropist
type affect the total number of accepted papers but do
not influence the quality selection process. We therefore
neglect them and remain with three types of referees:
the correct, the random and the rational, their respective
fractions being fc, frnd and fr, with fc + frnd + fr = 1.
To model effects of mutually favoring friendship net-
works where friends (or members of some group such as
co-authors) accept each other’s work regardless of qual-
ity, we introduce a variant of the model. We randomly
chose L scientists who belong to a (say co-authorship)
network within the community. N − L authors do not
belong the network. Regardless of referee type, if the au-
thor of a submitted paper i and the referee j both belong
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FIG. 1: Average quality of accepted papers at each timestep
for a community of correct referees (a) and one composed of
10% rational vs. 90 % correct referees (c). In (b) and (d) the
histograms of the respective timeseries (a) and (c) are shown
(red). For reference we indicate the quality distribution of
submitted papers (blue line in (b) and (d)). Note, that the
average quality of submitted papers is 100. The average paper
quality with 10% rational referees drops by about 10, i.e. one
standard deviation of the submitted paper distribution.
to the same group, the paper is automatically accepted.
The relevant parameter is relative group size, n = L/N .
The role of journals or funding agencies we model by
allowing them to ask referees to accept papers only if
they fall within the top q-quantile. According to the
previous notation, journals can specify their α. Unless
stated explicitly, we set α = 0, i.e. referees are asked to
accept above-average papers. Note, that only the correct
referees will comply with this requirement.
III. RESULTS
We implement the above model in a computer simula-
tion for N = 1000 scientists and 500 timesteps. We first
set α = 0, i.e. referees are asked to accept above average
articles only.
In Fig. 1 we show the time evolution of the average ac-
cepted quality of papers at each timestep. In (a) the situ-
ation is shown for a community of 100% correct referees.
After a short transition time the average paper quality
of accepted papers, rises above 120, i.e. only top quality
papers are selected. In Fig. 1 (b) we show the histogram
of the data points of Fig. 1 (a), i.e. accepted paper qual-
ity (red) over 500 timesteps. It is clear that the average
of the accepted papers is about 2 standard deviations
above the mean of the submitted papers (100). The ref-
eree process works at its best, only the very best papers
are published. In Figs. 1 (c) and (d) we show the same
as above, now for a community composed of 10% rational
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FIG. 2: Average quality of accepted papers as a function of
the abundance of rational referees. The three different scenar-
ios shown correspond to three fractions of random referees,
frnd = 0, 0.1 and 0.2. It is obvious that even small fractions
of rational referees bring down the system to select papers of
close to average quality. α = n = 0.
and 90% correct referees. It is immediately clear that the
average quality of the accepted papers drops drastically
– the same refereeing process with a small fraction of ra-
tional referees (10%) brings the quality down by almost
one standard deviation of submitted article quality.
The decline of average accepted paper quality as a
function of the fraction of rational referees in the com-
munity is shown in Fig. 2. For fractions of over 70% of
rational referees (an admittedly dark scenario) the selec-
tion mechanism in the refereeing process completely van-
ishes. The average quality of selected work falls within
a narrow band of average quality (100) and peer review
process turnes absurd. Fig. 2 further shows the situation
for two fixed fractions of random referees, frnd = 0.1 and
0.2. Clearly, the addition of random referees brings the
accepted paper quality down in a dramatic way. Quanti-
tatively, adding about 10% of random referees has prac-
tically the same effect as adding 10% of rational referees,
see Fig. 2.
In Fig. 3 we show the results from a simulation with
a friendship network present, whose members accept all
papers of authors belonging to the same network, regard-
less of paper quality or referee type. We set n = 0.1, i.e.
10% of the authors are part of such a network. Again
we plot the scenario as a function of abundance of ratio-
nal referees, frnd = 0, and α = 0. The figure compares
the average quality of papers of authors belonging to the
network (squares), to those of non-members (circles). As
expected, the quality of members of the network is dras-
tically lower than for the rest where the referee system
is not corrupted. The average quality of accepted pa-
pers in the total society drops from about 122 to 117 for
fr = 0. The acceptance rate of authors belonging to the
network is about a factor of 2 larger than for the correct
group, irrespective of the fraction of rational referees. In
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FIG. 3: Situation with a subgroup of authors (n = 0.1) who
accept all submissions from authors belonging to the same
group. The average accepted paper quality of the authors
from the group (squares) is compared to the one of those not
belonging to the cartel (circles), again shown as a function
of rational referees, fr. Obviously, when the refereeing sys-
tem is surpassed by a ’friendship-bias’ no quality selection is
possible. frnd = 0, α = 0.
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FIG. 4: Effect of journals asking for higher paper quality
standards. The cases α = 0 (circles) and α = 1 (squares) are
compared, which is a shift of one standard deviation. The
later leads to a significant drop of average accepted paper
quality. frnd = n = 0.
absolute terms the acceptance rate for the authors out-
side the network is about 5%. In the survey [14] a rate
of acceptance (within the first round) of about 8% was
reported, placing the model results in the right ballpark.
Finally, in Fig. 4 we show the effect of the journal ask-
ing referees to raise the quality threshold, i.e. α > 0. The
circles reflect the situation as in Fig. 2 (for frnd = 0).
Once referees are asked to raise their threshold from
α = 0 by one standard deviation to α = 1, quality drops
(squares). The reason is easily understanable: while cor-
rect referees, by raising their standards, accept less and
less (good) papers, the bias toward bad papers of the ra-
tional referees remains the same. The rational referees
gain more ’weight’ in the selection process with respect
to the correct ones, and the quality deteriorates.
IV. CONCLUSION
With a simple agent based model we have shown that
the standard peer reviewing process is not a robust way
for quality selection of scientific work. The presence of
relatively small fractions of ’rational’ and/or ’random’
referees (deviating from correct behavior) considerably
reduces the average quality of published or sponsored
science as a whole. We quantified the effect of nepo-
tism networks and demonstrated that under the presence
of ’rational’ referees quality-increasing strategies of jour-
nals or funding agencies can lead to adverse effects on a
systemic level. Our message is clear: if it can not be guar-
anteed that the fraction of ’rational’ and ’random’ refer-
ees is confined to a very small number, the peer review
system will not perform much better than by accepting
papers by throwing (an unbiased!) coin. For example
if the fractions of rational, random and correct referees
are approximately 1/3 each, the quality selection aspect
of peer review practically vanishes. We think that it is
important to try to think of ways to assess the actual
numbers within the different scientific communities. If it
turns out that e.g. frnd and fr fall above 30% it would be
necessary to re-think the prevailing system. Under these
circumstances – which are not totally unrealistic for cer-
tain communities – a purely random refereeing system
would perform equally well – and would at the same time
safe millions of man-hours spent on refereeing every year.
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